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ABSTRACT
As with other types of evidence, the courts make no presumption that digital
evidence is reliable without some evidence of empirical testing in relation to
the theories and techniques associated with its production. The issue of
reliability means that courts pay close attention to the manner in which
electronic evidence has been obtained and in particular the process in which the
data is captured and stored. Previous process models have tended to focus on
one particular area of digital forensic practice, such as law enforcement, and
have not incorporated a formal description. We contend that this approach has
prevented the establishment of generally-accepted standards and processes that
are urgently needed in the domain of digital forensics. This paper presents a
generic process model as a step towards developing such a generally-accepted
standard for a fundamental digital forensic activity–the acquisition of digital
evidence.
Keywords: digital forensics, computer forensics, evidence acquisition, forensic
process model, ADAM
1. INTRODUCTION
The general principle adopted by Australian courts for documents presented as
evidence is that a copy of a document is recognized as equivalent to the
original and that this applies to computer copies. This issue of reliability means
that courts pay close attention to the manner in which electronic evidence has
been obtained and in particular the process in which the data is captured and
stored. Unfortunately, the domain of digital forensics is lacking generally-
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accepted processes and procedures to which they and the courts can refer. The
Advanced Data Acquisition Model (ADAM) presented in this paper and in
Adams (2013) was developed to go some way towards addressing this issue.
Contrary to the contention of Buskirk and Liu (2006), who suggest that digital
evidence is automatically presumed to be reliable, we have a situation in
which, in the absence of anything better, courts are often using methods that
apply to ‘classical’ science to determine the reliability of objects from digital
forensics. In relation to this question of evidence reliability, two of Palmer’s
(2001) six phases of digital forensics relate directly to the acquisition of digital
evidence; Preservation and Collection. These two acquisition phases are open
to challenges in relation to breaks in the chain of evidence, the integrity of the
evidence, the completeness of the evidence or questioning the policies,
procedures and resources used to gather the evidence. As Rogers (2006) points
out “If doubt is cast on the initial collection and management of evidence,
output from the other phases is moot” (p. 12).
The multi-jurisdictional, multi-environmental nature of cases results in
different applications of digital forensic principles being seen by courts in
different ways; therefore the methodology employed by digital forensic
practitioners will always come under scrutiny (Kessler, 2010; Rogers, 2006).
This issue is not confined to the law enforcement environment as it applies
equally to the activities of many commercial practitioners working in the field
of digital forensics and incident response who may also be involved in legal
proceedings.
Ciardhuáin (2004) suggests that a comprehensive approach to modeling digital
forensic processes would have general benefits for IT managers, auditors and
others not necessarily involved in the legal process due to the increasing
incidence of crimes involving computers. Going further still, Trcek, Abie,
Skomedal and Starc (2010) suggest the notion of a widely agreed-upon
‘template legislation’ that would harmonize the practice of digital forensics on
an international basis.
A review of existing digital forensics models was presented in Adams (2013).
This review showed that none of the currently available models meet the needs
of practitioners and researchers, being criticized variously for being too
specific (Reith, Carr, & Gunsch, 2002), too broad (Rogers, 2006), too complex
(Selamat, Yusof, & Sahib, 2008), and too technical (Venter, 2006). We
contend that this has prevented the establishment of generally-accepted
standards and processes that are urgently needed in the domain of digital
forensics.
The ADAM model proposed here is designed to address those shortcomings
and to present a formal generic approach to acquiring digital evidence that can
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be adopted and applied by practitioners operating in the environments of
commerce, law enforcement and incident response.
2. DEVELOPING THE NEW MODEL
The design and development of the ADAM followed the design science
research process (DSRP) developed by Peffers, Tuunanen, Gengler, Rossi,
Hui, Virtanen, and Bragge (2006). The DSRP consists of six activities:







Problem Identification and Motivation
Objectives of a Solution
Design and Development
Demonstration
Evaluation
Communication

The DSRP is iterative, with feedback from the evaluation stage returning to the
design and development stage. The process followed to develop the model is
summarized next and is described in full in Adams (2013).
2.1 Model Design and Development
For the DSRP the problem identified was the lack of a generic process model
for the digital forensic acquisition process and the objective was to create such
a model with a formal description that could be adopted by practitioners
working in different areas of the discipline.
The scope of the model is restricted to the three areas of ‘commerce’, ‘incident
response’ and ‘law enforcement’ digital forensic activity within Australia. The
military environment has been excluded on the basis that for anyone outside of
this area of the armed forces it is extremely difficult to obtain data on their
processes and procedures and it has therefore been considered practical to only
identify essential key elements across the three stated environments.
Contributions from previous researchers as found in the literature, personal
experience of the primary author, and interactions with other digital forensic
practitioners were used to identify the requirements for the new model. For the
design and development stage the top-level approach was to:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Identify criteria against which existing models will be assessed.
Evaluate existing models against criteria.
Identify common requirements across different environments.
Propose a new model incorporating the requirements of the
different environments.
5. Demonstrate that the new model is adequate to fulfilling the
requirements, and revise where necessary.
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6. Test the new model with a panel of external evaluators, and revise
the model where necessary.
These stages are described next.
A review of the comments from other researchers on existing models that are
relevant to the research was used to formulate criteria for the overall
assessment of the models or to identify existing criteria that may be employed
in this way. The adopted criteria are based on those proposed by Carrier and
Spafford (2003):
1. The model must have a basis in existing physical crime scene
investigation theory;
2. The model must be practical–matching steps taken in actual
investigations;
3. The model must be technology neutral to ensure the process isn’t
constrained by current products and procedures;
4. The model must have specificity in relation to the classifications or
categories used in order to facilitate technology requirement
development; and
5. The model must be applicable to all possible user communities.
In addition to the identified assessment criteria, the models were considered in
the light of the Daubert tests (Daubert,1993).
In total, 18 models were evaluated against the criteria identified (Agarwal,
Gupta, Gupta, & Gupta, 2011; Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2004; Beebe &
Clark, 2004; Bogan & Dampier, 2005; Carrier & Spafford, 2003; Ciardhuain,
2004; Freiling & Schwittay, 2007; Ieong, 2006; Kent, Chevalier, Grance, &
Dang, 2006; Khatir, Hejazi, & Sneiders, 2008; Kohn, Eloff, & Olivier, 2006;
Mann, 2004; Reith et al., 2002; Rogers, 2006; Selamat et al., 2008;
Stephenson, 2003; Venter, 2006; Wang & Yu, 2007). Each existing model was
reviewed to determine which, if any, of the identified assessment criteria had
been met by that model. The overall results were summarized.
Although digital forensic tools and processes are employed across a number of
environments the environment scope for this process model has been restricted
to the three areas of ‘commerce’, ‘incident response’ and ‘law enforcement’
digital forensic activity. The military environment has been excluded on the
basis that for anyone outside of the armed forces it is extremely difficult to
obtain data on their processes and procedures and it has therefore been
considered practical to only identify essential key elements across the three
stated environments. Those models most closely meeting the assessment
criteria were considered for their possible contribution to the new model. A set
of model attributes were constructed to obtain both the core elements that are
common across the three areas of digital forensic practice that form the focus
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of this research as well as any innovative suggestions made by individual
researchers that might enhance the new model.
The contributions of previous researchers through their process models was
used as the basis for the new model whilst paying particular attention to
‘domain-specific’ attributes (i.e., those associated specifically with either the
commerce, incident response or law enforcement environments) to ensure that
they were accommodated. Particular attention was paid to criticisms of
previous models to gain insight into potential design or implementation pitfalls
whilst ensuring that the model remained ‘forensically sound’.
2.2 Summary of Model Requirements
Three stages were identified by combining the key contributions and
considering the reviewed models collectively: an initial planning stage (Stage
1), an onsite survey stage (Stage 2), and the acquisition stage itself (Stage 3).
Each of these stages is logically separate in that it is undertaken at a particular
point in time and the three stages are followed sequentially. The activities
associated with each stage are summarized as:
1. An initial preparation stage that incorporates activities that take
place once the practitioner is notified or becomes aware of a
potential requirement to undertake some work but prior to them
gaining access to the ‘incident scene1’ (the detail of training, lab
preparation and other activities prior to the notification/awareness
point is not the subject of this model).
2. Actions that the practitioner undertakes to prepare for the
acquisition of digital data once they have access to the ‘incident
scene’ including, but not limited to, safety considerations,
documentation, securing the scene and identifying potential
locations for relevant digital data.
3. The actual process of acquiring digital data that may be of
evidentiary value and its subsequent handling.
2.3 Model Representation
The complete representation of the ADAM consists of three related documents:
the formal representation in UML, the Principles, and set of Operation Guides.
UML Activity Diagrams are incorporated within the ADAM to define process
flows. Kohn, et al. (2008) suggest that because existing digital forensic process
models are presented in an informal way they would benefit from the
introduction of a formal modelling approach and so too would the whole area
of digital forensic investigation. The formal approach proposed by Kohn, et al.
1

The environment in which the evidence is thought to reside.
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(2008) employs the Unified Modelling Language (UML)2. The use of the UML
is supported by Bogan and Dampier (2005) as well as Ruan and Huebner
(2009) who conclude that the UML is appropriate to describe the high-level
processes involved in digital forensics on the basis that the UML is a de facto
standard modelling language.
This research will develop the use of UML in digital forensics by employing
UML Activity Diagrams within the ADAM to define process flows. Other
UML representations, such as Case Diagrams, were not be adopted based on
earlier examples of their use (Kohn, et al., 2008; Ruan & Huebner, 2009) as
they appeared to add little value to the description of the process model and, in
addition, would have to be tailored for each environment (as the ‘players’
would not be the same across all environments), thereby making the overall
model less generic.
In order to assist the practitioner to apply the concepts and processes that form
the ADAM, an Operation Guide was developed for each of the three stages.
The Operation Guides state what the practitioner MUST and SHOULD do in
each stage, but at a level of detail that permits customization within each case.
2.4 Evaluation and Testing
In order to assess how the ADAM addressed the stated research problem a
‘desk check’ approach was adopted in which the activities from three previous
in-house investigations were mapped to the activities in the ADAM and any
discrepancies recorded. In addition, four scenarios were created in order to
perform a ‘walkthrough’ of the ADAM. This was followed by external
evaluation of the model by experts. Pace and Sheehan (2002) note that a
primary validation technique for models and simulations incorporates some
form of review by experts and peers. This approach has been supported by
other researchers in different environments but the common theme is to draw
upon knowledge that cannot be obtained through reference to other data
sources and applying this knowledge to the evaluation of an artefact such as a
model.
3. THE ADVANCED DATA ACQUISITION MODEL (ADAM)
The complete ADAM is now described, under the headings of the three stages
identified in the requirements. Each stage is described and then represented
formally in UML, and its Operation Guide presented.
A common factor associated with all three stages is documentation.
Documentation is vital to ensure that a record is kept of all activity associated
2

Defined and maintained by the Object Management Group. Further information
available at http://www.uml.org/.
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with the acquisition of the electronic data and subsequent transportation and
storage as there is the potential for the whole process to come under close
scrutiny in court. A practitioner following the ADAM is required to ensure that
appropriate documentation be maintained at all times.
The ADAM incorporates two key assumptions [in accordance with the relevant
ISO/IEC document (ISO/IEC, 2012)3]:



The digital forensic practitioner is authorized, trained and qualified
with specialized knowledge, skills and abilities for performing digital
evidence acquisition, handling and collection tasks.
The digital forensic practitioner observes the requirements that their
actions should be auditable (through maintenance of appropriate
documentation), repeatable where possible (in that using the same tools
on the same item under the same conditions would produce the same
results), reproducible where possible (in that using different tools on
the same item would produce substantially similar results) and
justified.
3.1 ADAM Principles

Overriding principles that must be followed by the digital forensic practitioner
were developed following the literature review of previous models, standards
and other texts. These principles are defined within the ADAM as:
1. The activities of the digital forensic practitioner should not alter the
original data. If the requirements of the work mean that this is not
possible then the effect of the practitioner’s actions on the original data
should be clearly identified and the process that caused any changes
justified.
2. A complete record of all activities associated with the acquisition and
handling of the original data and any copies of the original data must
be maintained. This includes compliance with the appropriate rules of
evidence, such as maintaining a chain of custody record, and
verification processes.
3. The digital forensic practitioner must not undertake any activities
which are beyond their ability or knowledge.
4. The digital forensic practitioner must take into consideration all
aspects of personal and equipment safety whilst undertaking their
work.
5. At all times the legal rights of anyone affected by your actions should
be considered.
3

This document provides guidelines for specific activities in the handling of
digital evidence.
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6. The practitioner must be aware of all organizational policies and
procedures relating to their activities.
7. Communication must be maintained as appropriate with the client,
legal practitioners, supervisors and other team members.
3.2 Stage 1 Initial Planning
The first stage, Initial Planning, is where high-level considerations that relate to
the documentation associated with the investigation, the investigation logistics
etc., are determined. This may involve a covert survey (sometimes carried out
by private detectives) depending on the type and nature of the investigation
being undertaken. In some instances, such as where law enforcement officers
have already seized devices and present them for examination to the digital
forensic practitioners, this stage may be very brief and simply consist of
checking paperwork.
In the ideal world it would be possible to obtain perfect knowledge of the
environment containing the electronic data to be acquired thus enabling a
detailed plan to be created that would simply have to be followed on site.
However in practice the digital forensic examiner often has insufficient detail
about the computer systems, quantity and location of data, types of hard disk or
the operating system involved to enable anything beyond a rough outline of a
plan to be produced.
Several sets of constraints must be considered in this stage: authorization
constraints, physical constraints, timing constraints and data constraints.


Authorization constraints – The primary consideration, before
addressing the process detail, must be one of ensuring that the digital
forensic practitioner has the authority to undertake the work. This
authority can be made up of several discrete elements: (1) authority
from the organization providing the services (internal authorization);
(2) authority in law; and (3) authority from the owner of the resources
containing the material to be acquired (external authorization).



Physical constraints – Physical access to the systems containing
electronic data is generally not considered in any great depth by other
models and is often approached from the perspective of a commercial
digital forensic practitioner simply needing to determine if data may be
located at more than one site. The only other aspect of physical
constraints that tends to be considered is dealing with external ‘attacks’
on systems involving the Internet which leads to a discussion of the
attack’s technical characteristics. With regard to physical constraints
the new model involves two considerations that need to be addressed
prior to undertaking the data acquisition; physical access to the
resources containing the data to be acquired and is whether the data is
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held on resources at more than one location, either on separate sites or
scattered between different offices or floors within the same building.


Timing constraints – An important aspect of the planning stage is
determining constraints based on time. Several authors refer to
choosing appropriate techniques or methods based on ‘practical’
considerations but do not include timing as part of their initial
preparation. Some authors, especially those basing their discussions on
in-house digital forensic practitioners, don’t consider the timing
aspects at all. The ADAM requires consideration of three aspects of
timing constraints; (1) the terms of court orders and warrants; (2)
getting to the premises before the subject of the court order leaves for
work (or some other activity); and (3) for commercial premises
ensuring the key holder is available to provide access to the offices.



Data constraints – The data is the electronic information that is the
target of the acquisition process and can take many forms. As for other
aspects of the planning stage it is not always clear at the outset whether
there is in fact any data that is relevant to the investigation or where
this data might be located.

The ADAM requires consideration of the potential quantity of data that may be
acquired. Therefore there are three data constraints considered:





Identification of data – The type of data to be acquired can vary
greatly. The processes undertaken in relation to this constraint may
have a significant impact on the time required to carry out the work.
Amount of data – The amount of data to be acquired will have a direct
impact on the amount of storage space required for the acquisition
disks and also the amount of time that will be involved in the
acquisition process itself.
Location of data – If the data to be reviewed and acquired is stored on
backup tapes, i.e., the time period of interest is such that the data is not
likely to be currently residing on any ‘live’ systems, access to a means
of restoring the relevant backup tapes will need to be considered or a
plan put in place to remove and duplicate the tapes offsite.

The output of the Initial Planning stage should be the Outline Plan. Based on
the outcome of the previous considerations the logistics of the acquisition
exercise can now be considered. Without a survey of the site(s), which is
normally not practical due to the urgency of the work, only a reasonable
estimate can be made at this stage with certain contingency measures put in
place, e.g., somebody placed on ‘standby’ to collect and deliver additional
storage media, application software or other resources. A key part of the
Outline Plan implementation is a briefing. Answers to the following questions
need to be addressed:
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How many trained personnel are required?
How many teams are required, where do they need to be and at what
date/time? (this may be influenced by how many lawyers are available)
How many sets of equipment are required and what should be in those
kits?
Are any particular specialist skills required, if so how are they to be
made available? (e.g., someone with mainframe server knowledge may
need to be at a specific location)
How much storage media is required at each location and how can this
be supplemented if necessary?
Will the services of another employee/contractor be required? (e.g., a
system IT administrator to assist with shutting down servers or
locating backup tapes).

There is no consensus or standard set of guidelines for what equipment should
be considered for inclusion in the onsite kit and as the composition of the kit
contents should be determined by the appropriate digital forensic professional
the ADAM is not intended to provide this level of detail.
The activities in the ADAM Stage 1 are summarized in the formal UML
representation in Figure 1. To complement the UML diagrams an Operational
Guide is provided for each of the three stages.
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Figure 1 ADAM Stage 1 Initial Planning

3.2.1 Operation Guide for Stage 1 Initial Planning
The digital forensic practitioner:
MUST understand the requirements of the task, document the work to be
performed and have this confirmed by the client or person providing the
instructions to undertake the acquisition task.
MUST consider if the work can be undertaken by confirming that you have
the appropriate:


internal authorization and/or
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external authorization and/or
authority in law

MUST consider




time constraints – is the task achievable within the time allowed?
physical constraints – access to the data and physical/logical
locations
data constraints – how will the potential evidence be identified,
how much is there likely to be?

MUST consider safety issues
SHOULD create the Outline Plan (an exception being in-house acquisition
from devices already obtained, e.g., at law enforcement computer crime
laboratories)
3.3 Stage 2 The Onsite Plan
In Stage 2, all the gaps in knowledge relating to the location, size and format of
the devices holding the electronic data are filled in and the main acquisition
plan is created. There may be instances in which this stage may be irrelevant as
in the case for previously obtained devices mentioned above.
Having gained access to the site(s) in which relevant electronic data is thought
to be stored, steps must be taken to ensure that the risk of potential evidentiary
data being destroyed or removed is reduced as much as possible.
In order to provide a consistent and generic approach the ADAM contains
basic procedures to be followed when attending the site as a pre-cursor to
reviewing the Outline Plan. Rather than being too prescriptive and reducing the
necessary flexibility required of a digital forensic practitioner the basic
procedures are general in nature which ensures that they can be applied in
different environments.
Once the digital forensic practitioner is on site the Outline Plan needs to be
reviewed and updated now that its various assumptions can be tested. There
will often be areas of the plan that could not be completed at all prior to
attending the site(s) containing the electronic data. If more than one site is
involved there will be the need to have separate Onsite Plans to take account of
the specific local circumstances. The overall goals will likely remain the same
but the steps to be taken in order to achieve them may have to be altered. This
is where the knowledge and experience of the digital forensic practitioner
responsible for the particular site is critical. The activities in the ADAM Stage
2 are summarized in the formal UML representation in Figure 2.
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Figure 2 ADAM Stage 2 The Onsite Plan

3.3.1 Operation Guide for Stage 2 Creating the Onsite Plan
The digital forensic practitioner:
MUST identify and address any security or safety issues
MUST secure access to all potential sources of evidence, either directly or
remotely
MUST undertake a preliminary survey and document changes to the
Outline Plan
MUST consider


all the locations that might need to be searched
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any issues that must be addressed relating to hardware and
software
personnel and equipment needs for the investigation
whether onsite acquisition, offsite acquisition or a mixture of
both is appropriate and possible
3.4 Stage 3 Acquisition

Given the many different potential scenarios it would not be practical or
appropriate to develop detailed guidelines that could be generally applied. Each
organisation undertaking the acquisition of digital evidence should have
developed their own procedures to supplement those of the UK Association of
Chief Police Officers’ (Williams, 2012) and International Standards
Organization Guidelines (ISO/IEC, 2012) but inevitably it is down to the
practitioner to decide how these guidelines are to be applied in a particular set
of circumstances.
The ADAM is based on the belief that it is the role of the digital forensic
practitioner to determine the most appropriate technique to be employed and
maintain documentation of all activities associated with data acquisition. This
will include starting the ‘chain of evidence’ and other documentation such that
they will be able to describe their actions and reasons to a court. The activities
in the ADAM Stage 3 are summarized in the formal UML representation in
Figure 3.
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Figure 3 ADAM Stage 3 Acquisition
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3.4.1 Operation Guide for Stage 3 Acquisition of Digital Data (per device)
The digital forensic practitioner MUST identify the most appropriate way of
acquiring potential evidence given the constraints of time, resources, potential
evidentiary value and technical limitations.
In order to do this the digital forensic practitioner:
MUST consider











The most appropriate method of shutting down system(s) if
applicable
Write-protection method including interface, e.g., via
USB/FireWire/eSATA
Addressing encryption issues
The appropriateness of undertaking live acquisition
Acquisition software to be used
Source device interface(s) – e.g., boot device on host, storage
device removed and attached to acquisition system, network
acquisition, operating system (live acquisition)
Potential volume of data
Target storage capacity
Target interface (speed-related)
Prioritizing acquisition if more than one source

MUST maintain comprehensive notes
SHOULD consider photographing and/or sketching the equipment and
storage device locations
MUST consider the requirements or benefits of an initial review of
potential evidence devices and decide if it is appropriate for this to be
carried out ‘live’ or write-blocked
SHOULD create a ‘working copy’ of acquired data as quickly as possible
and concurrent with the creation of the master copy if possible
MUST keep all copies of acquired data secure
MUST be able to verify the integrity of acquired data
4. EXAMPLE OF USING THE ADAM

Scenario – A government regulator (BigReG) with powers to carry out
investigations, including the use of computer forensics, is notified of a possible
breach of the Business Trading Act by Company A. Following enquiries
Senior Investigator B decides to undertake a seizure of all company documents
relating to the activities of Company A including data held on their fileserver.
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Throughout the following activities contemporaneous notes are maintained and
the appropriate documentation is completed as required by internal procedures.
4.1 ADAM Stage 1 Initial Planning
Senior Investigator B confirms that all the appropriate authorizations have been
obtained and creates an Outline Plan based on the information already obtained
through initial enquiries. This plan includes the names of the team members to
take part in a raid on the premises of Company A.
As a record that all Stage 1 ADAM activities have been completed Senior
Investigator B dates and signs a hard copy of the Stage 1 Activity Diagram as a
file note.
4.2 ADAM Stage 2 The Onsite Plan
Senior Investigator B and his team arrive unannounced at the premises of
Company A. Senior Investigator B shows the court order to a director of
Company A and requests that all personnel except the IT Manager leave the
premises having turned over their mobile phones and external storage devices
to Team Member 2 who will provide a receipt. Senior Investigator B
supervises the IT Manager who ensures that all external connections to the
network are blocked. Senior Investigator B tasks his team members to
undertake a preliminary survey of the locations of potential evidence having
considered security and safety issues.


Team Member 1 reports back that Company A outsources its main
IT infrastructure, such as its fileserver, to CloudsRUS, an internet
provider of Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).



Team Member 2 reports back that all senior executives have
company-provided iPhones.



Team Member 1 obtains the appropriate login credentials for the
network.



Team Member 3 reports back that all the laptops for the three
senior executives run full disk encryption.



Senior Investigator B updates the Preliminary Plan to create the
Onsite Plan taking into consideration the new circumstances
identified by Team Members 1, 2 and 3.



As a record that all Stage 2 ADAM activities have been completed
Senior Investigator B dates and signs a hard copy of the Stage 2
Activity Diagram as a file note.
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4.3 ADAM Stage 3 Acquisition of Digital Data
Acquiring cloud data


Senior Investigator B determines that the fileserver on the host
machine of CloudsRUS will be imaged remotely using the
appropriate tools as set out in the Standard Procedures of BigReG.
A record of this decision is made by Senior Investigator B in his
notes.



Senior Investigator B tasks Team Member 1 to undertake the
acquisition as she has the necessary skills.



Team Member 1 uses the appropriate login credentials for the
network and follows BigReG Standard Procedures to run a remote
process on the Company A fileserver located on the cloud
platform. Team Member 1 creates a forensic copy of the fileserver
data onto a blank hard disk (the ‘master’ disk for this forensic
acquisition) that has been checked for integrity and labelled based
on the forensic procedures of BigReG.



A hash verification value for the acquired data is calculated and
recorded on the Evidence Acquisition Form produced by BigReG
in accordance with BigReG procedures.



All other details of the acquisition process are recorded on the
Evidence Acquisition Form.

Acquiring mobile phone devices


Senior Investigator 1 determines that the senior executive iPhones
will be seized and transported back to the forensic lab of BigReG
for processing by their specialist forensic investigator.



Senior Investigator 1 tasks Team Member 2 with collecting all the
iPhones, securing them in evidence bags and completing the
appropriate chain of custody records before transporting them back
to the forensic lab for imaging.



Team Member 2 transports the seized equipment to the forensic
lab and hands them over to Mobile Device Investigator A who
signs the chain of custody form.



Mobile Device Investigator A processes each of the iPhones using
the appropriate software and techniques as set out in BigReG
procedures for acquiring iPhone data and records his activities on
an Evidence Acquisition Form for each device. The acquired
iPhone data is stored within the relevant directory on the BigReG
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Forensic Network Attached Storage (NAS) device and hash values
are taken and recorded.


After all the iPhone data has been acquired Team Member 2 takes
possession of them, completes the chain of custody record and
returns to Company A where the iPhones are returned to the IT
Manager who signs for them by completing the chain of custody
record.

Acquiring encrypted laptop drives


Senior Investigator B obtains a copy of the encryption recovery
software and appropriate recovery data for each laptop.



Senior Investigator B determines that the task of acquiring the
forensic images and then decrypting them onsite is not practical
and therefore tasks Team Member 3 with seizing the three laptop
computers for processing back at the forensic lab.



Team Member 3 provides a receipt for the three laptop computers
and completes the Chain of Custody record before placing them in
separate evidence bags.



Team Member 3 transports the three laptop computers to the
forensic lab where he reviews the BigReG Operating Procedures
for dealing with the encryption being used.



Team Member 3 follows the BigReG Operating Procedures and
stores the decrypted drive images on the Forensic NAS in the
relevant directory. The process used and the resulting hash values
of the decrypted drives are stored on the Evidence Acquisition
Form used by BigReG.

Senior Investigator B remains supervising onsite until the acquisition of the
fileserver data is completed and the iPhones have been returned. He then
checks the Evidence Acquisition Forms and then dates and signs the ADAM
Stage 3 Activity diagram for the fileserver and each of the iPhones as a record
that all of the activities have been carried out. Once the laptop drives have been
decrypted and the laptops have been returned Investigator B checks the Chain
of Custody records and the Evidence Acquisition Forms for the laptop images.
Working copies of all the acquired images and logical containers are created in
accordance with the ADAM and as per BigReG Policies and Procedures.
Senior Investigator B dates and signs the ADAM Stage 3 Activity Diagram for
each of the laptops as a record that all of the activities have been completed.
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5. DISCUSSION
The expert evaluation and walkthrough scenarios demonstrate that the ADAM
has the potential to formally describe the activities followed by digital forensic
practitioners working in the areas of commerce, law enforcement and incident
response.
For a process model, the validity comes from the degree to which it adheres to
guiding principles around which the process is organized. The model is usable
if people can use it in real scenarios to arrange and sequence their activities to
move through the process and generate the required outcomes easily and
efficiently. The model has prescriptive power if it steers the process,
recommends some courses of action and cautions against others. The
prescriptive power of the model comes from the UML Activity diagrams for
the three stages of the ADAM and the associated Operation Guides that are
intended to guide the practitioner through the process of acquiring digital
evidence. The model also underwent an independent evaluation of this
prescriptive power to determine if the model is usable. The testing process
involved two independent panels of reviewers whose feedback was considered
and the necessary changes made to the model.
However, some limitations of the work remain. For the in-house evaluation
only a small number of cases were selected and these are not claimed to be
representative of all the activities undertaken by the organization. This activity
provided only a preliminary ‘proof-of-concept’ to determine if there were any
serious issues with the model structure and contents prior to the more
substantive evaluation carried out by external reviewers.
Although each of the three areas–commercial practice, incident response and
law enforcement–were represented by at least one external reviewer, this
cannot be considered as being a significant sample of the population of digital
forensic practitioners working in Australia as, for example, the Linked-In
group ‘Digital Forensics Association’ has around 90 practitioners registered.
However, the external reviewers that participated were made up of both
‘Experts’ and ‘Practitioners’ who have extensive skills, interest and experience
in the area of digital forensics. In terms of feedback that is directly relevant in
this research, several of the reviewers are the authors of previous process
models.
The members of the Practitioners Panel all work within the digital forensic
environment in Australia. Whilst the work of digital forensics has many
common features on an international level, the fact that other practitioners are
operating in different jurisdictions under different laws means that for this
research it was deemed inappropriate to attempt to cater for many different
environments requiring a much larger sample of practitioner reviewers. This
decision was partly based on experience of being a member of a working group
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on digital evidence that is trying to take into account the activities of
practitioners from many different countries. However, despite the focus on
Australia, this research could be used as the basis of a process model that is
applicable in other jurisdictions with only minor alterations.
An assumption has been made that the courts will not be required to conform
to a new international standard to determine the reliability of digital evidence
that is incompatible with the new model developed in this research. However,
the processes described in the ADAM can be readily adapted to accommodate
additional requirements. The ADAM is also in accordance with recommended
best practice as detailed in the ISO/IEC document (2012).
The ADAM has yet to be independently evaluated in the field. Future work
should include a more comprehensive trial by practitioners as part of a wider
study. The current focus on Australia could also be extended to other
jurisdictions by seeking input and feedback from overseas practitioners,
potentially through one of the international organizations such as the High
Technology Crime Investigators Association.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced the Advanced Digital Acquisition Mode (ADAM), a
generic model of the digital forensic acquisition process that can be adopted by
practitioners working in three key areas of digital forensics: commercial
practice, incident response and law enforcement. By deliberately identifying
the key high-level processes and leaving implementation of detailed policies
and low-level procedures to the digital forensic practitioners the ADAM
addresses the potential risk that in a fast-changing environment such as digital
forensics a model may quickly become obsolete as new technology is adopted.
The ADAM is described using a proven formal notation, the Unified Modeling
Language, which from a practical perspective will aid the courts in relation to
the presentation of digital evidence through a better understanding of the
process.
The end result of using the ADAM is a clear process description that can be
explained in court together with associated documentation that will support the
description of the activities undertaken by a digital forensic practitioner who
has acquired digital data. As the ADAM allows for the use of existing forms
and processes (where relevant) these can be incorporated into the supporting
documentation.
Having established a formal process model for the initial stages of digital
forensics, future research can build on the UML Activity diagrams and textual
representations of the ADAM to incorporate other activities of digital forensic
practitioners (such as analysis and presentation) in the same format in order to
provide a complete formal model of digital forensics.
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